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ABSTRACT: This paper follows the route of the usurper Constantine 
III since he was made emperor by the troops in Britain in 407 A. D., until 
his defeat under the magister militum Constantius. Conceived as a whole 
– and not, as it usually is, in a fragmentary and marginal way –, and pro-
viding for the first time a precise chronology, this episode contributes to a 
better understanding of the developement of political, social and military 
structures in the western part of the Empire during the first years of the 
1. This paper is, to a large extent, the result of my master’s thesis, supervised by Prof. 
R. Sanz, whose patient teaching, support, corrections, and guiding through countless office 
hours are responsible for almost everything of value that can be read here. The remaining 
mistakes are my sole responsibility. More than sixty years ago, Oxford professor and 
occasional member of the Inklings C. E. Stevens, published ‘Marcus, Gratian, Constantine’ 
in number 35 of Athenaeum, back in 1957, of whose lecture I have greatly benefited in 
regard to unravelling the fascinating story of Constantine III. The last words on his paper 
are still relevant today and that is why, in gratitude, I am borrowing them and making them 
my own, for, like him, ‘I should like to hope that the efforts which I have made to unravel 
the story are not unworthy of the story itself’.
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5th century. Constantine’s usurpation was planned upon the model of the 
Imperium Galliarum, and its hatching meant great modifications within its 
territories. In Hispania, a series of landed aristocrats related to Theodosius’s 
family standed against the usurpers, and with private troops – recruited 
among their own slaves and clients –, they started a war against the new 
regime. Despite losing it, this had severe consequences in the province’s 
politics. After Constantine mastered the ruledom over both Gaul and Spain, 
as well as Britain, he was betrayed by his general Gerontius. During their 
confrontation, Suebi, Alans, and Vandals entered the Iberian Peninsula. In 
the end, Honorius was able to take control again and defeat the usurpers, 
but the consequences for the Hispanias’s demography would prove them-
selves to be indelible.
Keywords: Private armies; 409 A. D.; usurpers; Britain; Honorius; Didymus 
and Verinianus; mass migrations; Late Roman Spain.
RESUMEN: Este artículo sigue la ruta emprendida por el usurpador 
Constantino III desde su proclamación imperial por parte de las tropas 
de Britania en el año 407 d. C. hasta su derrota bajo el magister militum 
Constancio. Estudiado de forma íntegra –y no, como es habitual, de manera 
fragmentaria y marginal–, y por primera vez estableciendo una cronología 
precisa, este episodio contribuye a una mejor comprensión del desarrollo 
de las estructuras políticas, sociales y militares en el Imperio Occidental 
durante los primeros años del siglo v. La usurpación de Constantino fue 
planificada siguiendo el modelo del Imperium Galliarum, y su eclosión 
supuso importantes modificaciones en los territorios que abarcaba. En 
Hispania, una serie de miembros de la aristocracia territorial, emparenta-
dos con la familia de Teodosio, se levantaron contra los usurpadores. Con 
ejércitos privados (compuestos por tropas reclutadas de entre sus propios 
esclavos y clientes), comenzaron una guerra contra el nuevo régimen, y, 
a pesar de no ganarla, sus acciones provocaron severas consecuencias en 
las políticas provinciales. Tras hacerse con el control de Galia e Hispania, 
además de Britania, Constantino fue traicionado por su general Geroncio. 
Durante su confrontación, suevos, vándalos y alanos irrumpieron en la 
Península. Finalmente, Honorio logró retomar el control y derrotó a los 
usurpadores, pero las consecuencias para la demografía de Hispania de-
mostraron ser irreversibles.
Palabas clave: Ejércitos privados; 409 d. C.; usurpadores; Britania; 
Honorio; Dídimo y Veriniano; migraciones masivas; Hispania tardorromana.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the year 415 A. D., a man named Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus, 
best known as Jerome of Stridon, while writing one of his many and 
famous letters, referred to Britain as a land ‘fertile in usurpers’2. He was 
not misguided, as it had been barely four years since the fall of one of the 
most notable usurpers that the island ever produced, whose actions had 
left an indelible mark on the continent.
Back in the last months of 406, the troops cantoned in Britain, fearful 
of the news on invasions coming from the continent, and feeling aban-
doned by Honorius’s misrule, mutinied3. They made Marcus, possibly the 
Comes Britanniae4, emperor. Then, not being pleased with his behaviour, 
they murdered him and had him replaced with Gratianus, who appar-
ently was native to Britannia: municeps eiusdem insulae5. Although he 
was given an imperial guard, four months after being risen he suffered 
the same fate as his predecessor, probably around March or April 407. All 
sources6 agree that his deposition had the immediate consequence of the 
elevation of Constantine to the throne, whose success, or at least his abil-
ity to hold his position more than a few months, earned him the epithet 
of ‘the third’7.
2. HIER., Epist., 133. Britannia, fertilis prouincia tyrannorum.
3. ZOS. 6. 2, 1; 6. 3, 1; SOZ. 9. 11, etc.
4. FRERE 1973, 364. Apparently, there were three military commands in Britain at the 
time. The Comes Britanniae (N.D. Occ., XXIX), the Dux Brittaniarum (N.D. Occ., XL) and 
the Comes litoris Saxonici per Britanniam (N.D. Occ., XXVIII). The latter were in command 
of limitanei, whilst the first one was in charge of comitatenses, stationed in Britain in an 
unknown date. Other defences (such as the Cardiff Fort or the Werry Wall at Lancaster) do 
not figure in the Notitia (ESMONDE-ClEARy 1989, 53), which of course is not entirely reliable.
5. OROS. 7. 40, 4. This municeps has been traditionally understood (Cf. STEvENS 1957, 
322; FRERE 1973, 364, et al.) as curialis, not as a person with local origo. For some (Cf. SANZ 
HUESMA 2005, 322), this would mean that Gratian was nothing but a mere puppet operated 
by Constantine. Even if Gratian was an actual municipal senator, which is doubtful, that 
assertion cannot be deduced by what is known from the sources. There are some con-
temporary examples of municeps meaning curialis (C. Th. 12. 1, 89, or CASSIOD. Var. 7. 47, 
3), but there is no proof that the original meaning had been lost, and it would be more 
plausible to think of a mistake of Orosius than having a member of the urban aristocracy 
being made Emperor by troops who wanted to become emancipated from the Empire and 
avoid the external perils.
6. OROS. 7. 40, 4; SOZ. 9. 11; ZOS. 6. 2, 2, OlyM. Frag., 13.
7. Not because he was the third in this series of usurpations, of course, but because 
his usurpation was successful enough to grant him the official recognition as emperor, the 
third one who beared this acclaimed name.
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The dating of the original mutiny – the one that placed Marcus on the 
throne – is not a minor thing, as it determines the rest of the chronolog-
ical sequence. Zosimus gives two contradictory testimonies; in 6. 2, 1 he 
places it on 407, during the seventh consulship of Honorius and the sec-
ond of Thedosius, whereas in 6. 3, 1 he places it one year before, on 406. 
Orosius’s acount8 is useless here, as he places both invasions and usurpa-
tions on the very late date of 408. Olympiodorus of Thebes is brief but 
clearer: he states that Marcus’s rising took place before Honorius’s seventh 
consulship9. This dating is preferable, not only because Olympiodorus is 
Zosimus’s main source, but also for its greatest precision: the reference to 
‘before’ the consulship probably means that it took place during the last 
months of 406 A. D. But Zosimus mentions the continental invasions as a 
major cause for the usurpations in Britain, and the date traditionally estab-
lished for the crossing of the Rhine by Suebi, Vandals and Alans, though 
rhetoric, is the 31st December 406. If the crossing of the Rhine was on the 
last moments of 406, it could not be a cause for what was happening at 
the same time or earlier in Britain10. However, if we look closely, Zosimus11 
states that the barbarians went through ‘those settings’, and by that he 
means the Alps, mentioned in the previous chapter12. Therefore, it must 
have been those Alpine invasions – different from the Rhine coalition, and 
previous to it – what created disturbances in Gaul, alerted the troops in 
Britain, and provoked their sedition. Many tend to emphasise the role of 
Suebi, Alans and Vandals, but Jerome13 points out Saxons and Herules as 
responisble for the chaos in Gaul. Alamanni and Burgundians must have 
also played an important role14, and soldiers may have chosen Marcus to 
honour Carausius, who defended Britain from Saxon pirates in the 3rd 
century, so a new pirate attack could also have had something to do15. 
Besides, we must not underestimate the role played by the widespread 
discontent among troops, especially between those cantoned in the lim-
ites, unpaid due to the lack of public funds, on account of the depletion of 
8. OROS. 7. 40, 4.
9. OlyM. Frag., 13.
10. M. KUlIKOwSKI (2000, 328-330) tried to overcome the obstacle by moving the inva-
sions backwards one year (31st December 405). This is little convincing, and not even the 
easiest solution, as it would be simpler to move the dates of the British usurpations bac-
kwards (making them, for example, a consequence of Radagaisus’s Italian invasion) than 
the Rhine crossing, which affects many other events.
11. ZOS. 6. 3, 1.
12. ZOS. 6. 2, 6.
13. HIER. Epist., 123.
14. ÁlvAREZ JIMéNEZ 2013, 92.
15. STEvENS 1957, 321.
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the territories’ economy, as shown by the severe fiscal pressure imposed 
by the emperors of the 4th and 5th centuries. Maintaining a healthy econ-
omy seemed an impossible challenge, due to the recurrent and persistent 
civil wars. The situation was worsened by the currency devaluation that 
had taken place since the 3rd century, as the amount of silver in coins had 
decreased considerably, at the same pace as price inflation increased16. 
Troops that were denied their corresponding stipendium were prone to 
elevate figures such as Constantine III.
Taking all of this into account, the beginning of Constantine’s reign 
can be established around the spring of 407. Not much is known of his life 
previous to his proclamation; it can be assumed that he was a Christian, as 
shown by the monastic condition of his eldest son, and by the behaviour 
displayed on his last days, and all sources describe him as a private17, sup-
posedly only chosen for the hope emanated from his name. Constantine 
proved he was determined not to make them lose more time, and, at 
once, appointed the new generals, Justinian and Neobigast18, sending 
them ahead of him to Gaul, so that they could start preparing his arrival 
and bringing to their side the troops stationed there19.
Figure 1. RIB 721. Drawn by R.G.C., 1929.
16. Cf. DEpEyROT 1987 and 1996; FERNÁNDEZ UBIñA 1982; CAllU 1969.
17. OROS. 7. 40, 4.
18. OlyM. Frag., 13. An inscription from Ravenscar (RIB 721 = CIL VII 268) attests a 
soldier named Justinian responsible for the construction of several defences, identified in 
various works (i.e. EvANS 1887, 207-209; PLRE II, Iustinianus 1) with Constantine III’s gene-
ral (Fig. 1).
19. ZOS. 6. 2, 2.
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We must bear in mind that, from the very moment he was risen to 
power, it was quite clear to Constantine that his task should not be con-
fined to a mere settlement of the situation at the north of Gaul for the sake 
of Britain. Rather, the fates of the whole western provinces were bound to 
be under his power. That was what made the difference with Marcus and 
Gratianus: Constantine had an actual Imperial plan. It was the scheme 
behind his political agenda, and therefore, what guided his actions at all 
times. It seems quite obvious that the activity he carried throughout the 
Praetorian Prefecture of Gaul included clear resemblances with Postumus 
and his Gallic Empire, with Magnus Maximus, and with the most suc-
cessful usurper of all times: Constantine the Great20. As Stevens21 rightly 
spotted, the appointment of two generals of the troops in Gaul before 
leaving Britain ‘means that he was appointing two magistri militum, as 
they had existed when the regions of the Gallic prefecture, Gaul, Spain 
and Britain, had their own Augustus’, that is, the Imperium Galliarum he 
would try to rebuild. The path he would then follow22 is the incarnation 
of his long-range project, built and modelled following the experience 
of other usurpers in the West. Perhaps his idea matured due to having 
others finding ‘hope in his name’, which sounds rather messianic, but it is 
even more likely that it was the opposite: when Constantine saw how he 
was drawn attention, he would not doubt of taking advantage of such an 
acclaimed anthroponym.
20. FANNINg1992, 288.
21. STEvENS 1957, 323.
22. It is easier to follow the story with the map (Fig. 2). Marta Guijarro has greatly 
contributed in its editing. It is here now thanks to her invaluable help.
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Figure 2. Map showing Constantine III’s progress, from his elevation in Britain until he 
completely dominated the Prefecture of Gaul. Source: María Fernández Portaencasa.
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2. EN ROUTE TO THE Dioecesis Hispaniarum
No sooner had he arrived at Gaul and settled his capital in Arelate23 
than, while he took care of the affairs related to the barbarians and gained 
control over the territory, several iudices were sent under his command 
to the Hispanias24. Although a confluence of riots, civil disorders and ten-
sions with those local authorities that remained loyal to Honorius would 
have been reasonably expectable, as a result of the imposition of this new 
regime25, it did not occur. In fact, these new governors were accepted 
‘obediently and without difficulty’, according to Orosius. Perhaps, those 
still faithful to Honorius did not exist at all, or maybe they could have fled, 
just as some of the Gallic magistrates presumably did.
Hispania, just as the rest of the provinces of the Empire, had its par-
ticular circumstances. While the Spanish provinces had been quite as 
neglected as the rest of the West by Honorius’s misrule, and although there 
also existed the same menace and fear that peoples roaming through Gaul 
could get into their territory, the Hispano-Romans had not responded to 
these issues with usurpations26. It is possible that the ‘obedience’ with 
which Orosius describes the way these iudices were received into the 
Hispanias was in fact due to that critical state: the arrival of new governors 
would mean an opportunity that, despite hazardous, could not be missed 
by a population who had seen how the imperial government had long 
stopped taking care of its duties and obligations with them; the feeling of 
having nothing to lose would be quite widespread. What was left of the 
exiguous militia – it could not be considered a professional army anymore 
– served as support for the governmental structures, which remained in 
place almost through force of habit, vulnerable to anyone willing to take 
their place. Therefore, it seems reasonable to think that this ‘obedience’ 
was really the only chance for those who did not look forward to new 
governors but could not afford a defence, and joining the cause would be 
the choice of those others who still held out hope for things improving in 
the Hispanias.
23. Early in 408, after having defeated Sarus – the Goth chieftain sent by Stilicho –, 
who beseiged him in Valentia (ZOS. 5. 31, 4). Arles was a very practical city: the head-
quarters of the praetorian prefect had been transferred there from Trier around spring 407 
(CHASTAgNOl 1973, 33). But it also held a great symbolism: known as the Constantina urbs 
(HEIJMANS 2007, 209), it was the birthplace of Constantine II.
24. OROS. 7. 40, 5. Misit in Hispanias iudices: quos cum prouinciae oboedienter acce-
pissent.
25. SANZ SERRANO 2009, 157.
26. ARCE 2007, 36.
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However, there was an actual exception, which would bring much 
trouble into the plans of the usurper. Shortly after the successful pronun-
ciamiento of Constantine’s envoys in the Hispanias, a resistance move-
ment began to take form. Despite the precarious situation in which the 
pair of Emperors found themselves, both in East and West ruled the 
Theodosian dynasty, which had managed to retain a particular popularity 
in the Hispanias, birthplace of Theodosius I and Arcadius, where they still 
had relatives. Being Gallaecian and contemporary with the events, Paulus 
Orosius’s testimony, despite its limitations, is the one with more useful 
information. Two brothers, Didymus and Verinianus, decided to face up 
the ‘tyrant’, defending themselves and their homeland27.
These young men are described as ‘noble and wealthy’; nevertheless, 
Orosius does not mention them having any actual position or appoint-
ment. Sozomen28 specifies that Didymus and Verinianus were ‘relatives of 
Honorius’ and that, previously, they had been at odds with each other, but 
had set their differences aside, as they found themselves ‘threatened by 
the same danger’. He also mentions another pair of brothers or cousins, 
who joined their fight as well – to a lesser extent, as they lived in a dif-
ferent province: Theodosiolus and Lagodius29. It is quite remarkable that, 
being Orosius the closest to the events, he is the only author that omits 
the kinship shared between the Emperor and these men. Probably he was 
not very pleased with Honorius’s disastrous way of ruling, and perhaps 
thought more appropriate not to associate such an emperor with the ones 
that he considered actual heroes30. Besides, due to the great admiration 
he seemed to have for them, he would try to picture their actions as more 
disinterested and honourable (‘to defend their homeland’) than ones done 
for mere defence of a relative, who, incidentally, was also the Emperor.
What does become clear from the texts is that, in Hispania, a series 
of members of families related to Theodosius’s own family – who plau-
sibly were wealthy landowners – had self-identified as the defenders of 
Honorius’s interests31. Neither were they part of the State system (rather, 
they operated in parallel), nor did they belong to a landed aristocracy 
as such, because, even tough their financial capacity was due to their 
landholding, their power resided in a series of relationship and influence 
networks within the courtly circles (without holding actual positions), as 
27. OROS. 7. 40, 5.
28. SOZ. 9.11.
29. SOZ. 9.12.
30. SANZ SERRANO 2009, 160-161.
31. SANZ SERRANO 1986, 235.
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a result of their imperial kinship; something that granted them a great 
independence. This has made some authors think of them as actual usurp-
ers, but far from that, Didymus, Verinianus, Theodosiolus and Lagodius, 
and perhaps some others whose names have been lost, would not desire 
more independence than the one they already enjoyed, but also would 
not want Constantine to deprive them of it. Defending the ‘imperial rights’, 
under the banner of their kinship, was the perfect excuse for maintaining 
their own status without taking on new responsibilities32.
Orosius, after emphasising their integrity, explains how they man-
aged to coordinate the defence, which would eventually take them to 
the Pyrenees. In the passage33, it is said that the combatants were serv-
ants from their own estates and lands, financed and equipped by them. 
Sozomen34 claims that they combined their forces, consisting mainly of 
armed peasants and slaves. This is a perfect example of what has been 
called a ‘private army’, something quite common at the time, which is not 
surprising, as it could be afforded and supported by their great riches35. 
According to Orosius, they gathered troops for a long time; however, and 
taking into account Sozomen’s indication on the problems with each other 
that these men had had, some time ago, and how on this particular occa-
sion they ‘combined their forces’, it seems more plausible that these armies 
were something already existing, not an ex novo creation. Given their 
composition, though – slaves, servants, clients, tenant farmers and, gener-
ally, workers from their own households and fields, in addition to merce-
naries, and others coming from punctual levies in the surroundings –, they 
would not be operational at all times. Once ready, the Spanish ringleaders 
would go directly against Constantine’s iudices. The new administration 
would surely be the main target of their private troops, as their major goal 
was to stop the instutionalisation and consolidation of this regime. News, 
of course, would not take long to arrive at Arles.
Constantine had two sons: Constans and Julian36, although we do not 
know if their names are due to an extraordinary coincidence or as a result 
32. Or as put by S. MARTíN (2007, 179-190) in a much simpler way, «es un auténtico «sál-
vese quien pueda»»; it is just the response that the wealthy landowners could give, counting 
on their own resources, to an unexpected crisis.
33. OROS. 7. 40, 6.
34. SOZ. 9.11.
35. The phenomenon of private armies in Late Antiquity has been widely and foremost 
studied by R. SANZ (1986, 225-264, with special attention to a brilliant definition on p. 226).
36. OlyM. Frag., 13.
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of a premeditated manoeuvre of dynastic politics37. What we do know 
for sure, and all sources agree, is that Constantine had planned to asso-
ciate his sons to his political program, and it would be the Spanish inci-
dent what would get this new stage underway. The eldest son, Constans, 
turned from monk into Caesar, would be responsible for stopping the 
Theodosian resistance in Hispania from depriving them of completing 
their Empire, as told by Orosius38, Sozomen39 and Zosimus40. 
Orosius is the only one to mention Constans’s secularization regarding 
these events, but it is likely that it had already taken place before leav-
ing Britannia, and that both sons would have already been helping his 
father during all of the usurpation process. Olympiodorus41 also alludes to 
Julian’s later designation as nobilissimus. Bearing in mind that until early 
408 Constantine would not have yet settled in Arles, and that Didymus, 
Verinianus, and the rest of Spanish ringleaders, probably needed some 
time to hatch the plan and prepare themselves (we must not forget that, 
first of all, they had to put aside their differences), it would be prudent 
considering March or April 408 as a date for the first attacks and the sub-
sequent reaction in Arles.
The answer that followed, besides his promotion to Caesar, meant 
for Constans being sent to the Hispanias, accompanied by his father’s 
strongmen, as Zosimus tells in detail42. It is not surprising that the newly 
appointed Caesar came escorted by a renowned general, Gerontius, and 
a praetorian prefect, Apollinaris, given that, from the few data availa-
ble (young, secularized not long ago, and presumably inexperienced), 
Constans was not exactly the ideal man for the mission that had been 
entrusted to him. Nevertheless, his symbolic power would indeed be quite 
effective among his supporters; what is more, and despite this has been 
ignored by most of the literature, the way in which Constans faced the 
situation, and the great loyalty shown to his father, demonstrate a great 
tenacity, which easily could have made up for his lack of experience. 
On his way to the Hispanias, Constantine put under his command an 
army made up mainly of barbarian troops, called Honoriaci, for they had 
37. Both Constans and Julian (son and nephew of Constantine I) were also linked to 
the governing of the West, and it is unlikely that Constantine III would have missed that 
precise detail.
38. OROS. 7. 40, 7.
39. SOZ. 9. 11.
40. ZOS. 6. 4, 1.
41. OlyM. Frag. 13.
42. ZOS. 6. 4, 2.
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previously served as allies to the Roman army43. Next, Orosius annotates 
that, as a result of all these events, hinc apud Hispanias prima mali labes: 
the wreck of the Hispanias took place.
Constantine was afraid of the hispanic Theodosians crossing the 
Pyrenees if he failed extinguishing the revolt, as pointed out by Zosimus44. 
If that were to happen, they would cover the western flank, leaving the 
eastern one defenceless before Honorius’s legions, which could easily 
leap on them from Italy, meaning a definitive ending to his Empire. For 
that reason, Constans’s mission was, both symbolic and physically, crucial 
for their own survival. At this point, sources, per se scarce, are particularly 
chaotic, fragmentary and obscure. All of them, though, contribute with 
some information that, taken as a whole and properly interpreted, can 
help to reconstruct the facts.
Orosius45 is the briefest, as he solely informs that both brothers tried 
to block the Pyrenees’s entrance with their private armies: qui tutari pri-
uato praesidio Pyrenaei Alpes moliebantur. Sozomen46 claims that the 
Spanish attacked Lusitania together, slaying many of the soldiers sent by 
the usurper for their capture, and he adds that Constans’s troops received 
some reinforcements soon after47. A little wider is Zosimus’s account48, but 
it is also the most surprising one, as he argues that the Spanish had started 
the war against Constans making use of the legions of Lusitania, before 
being forced to use their own private troops of peasants and servants, 
with whom they were almost able to put him in a very difficult position, 
if not directly defeating him. In the view of these pieces of information, it 
is essential to determine a chronological order and to clarify two elements 
in which, one way or another, all sources insist: the leading agents (that is, 
the troops) and the places in which events took place.
Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, whose work has been lost except 
for the fragments occasionally quoted by Gregory of Tours, is the only 
author to give a vital piece of information: that Constans had established 
in Caesaraugusta his court49. Therefore, it is plausible that, around May 
or June 408, Constans, Apollinaris, Gerontius, and their army, arrived in 
the Peninsula, settling themselves at the city nearby the River Ebro, since, 
not only was it still one of the main metropolises of the Hispanias (thus, 
43. OROS. 7. 40, 7.
44. ZOS. 6. 4, 2.
45. OROS. 7. 40, 8.
46. SOZ. 9. 11.
47. SOZ. 9. 12.
48. ZOS. 6. 4, 3.
49. gREg. TUR. H.F. 2, 9.
229MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ PORTAENCASA
A FIFTH-CENTURY «GALLIC EMPIRE»:  
HISPANIA AS PART OF CONSTANTINE III’S USURPATION
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 38, 2020, pp. 217-243
a well-communicated one), but also, barely 700 km away from Arles, 
seemed an excellent base of operations50. Once settled, they would hurry 
to get their troops arranged, so that the confrontation with the rebels 
could start as soon as possible.
The route probably took them through Emerita Augusta – consolidat-
ing their territorial control as they went –, since, not only it was the capital 
of the Diocese of Hispania, but also its surroundings were the area of 
major influence of Didymus and Verinanius at the time, and perhaps also 
their residence. Here is where the reference that the sources make to a 
confrontation in Lusitania fits; at last, the battle between Constans and his 
troops, and the Theodosians, took place. Zosimus’s statement51 on the sup-
posed legions of Lusitania fighting on the Spanish side also comes about 
at this point; however, the accuracy of this sentence seems little plausible. 
According to the Notitia Dignitatum, there was no such thing as an army 
in Lusitania in those days, and even if the Notitia is not entirely reliable, 
Zosimus’s statement still is a piece of information which clashes with the 
rest of the sources’ stories, not to mention that, precisely, he is one of the 
authors who most frequently mixes up events throughout his narration52. 
On the contrary, it seems that, at that time, only a few important detach-
ments remained at Hispania – in areas such as Palencia o Santander; not 
a single in Lusitania –, and, with the exception of Leon, they were not 
made up of legions, but of auxiliary cohorts of some five hundred men. 
Neither it is necessary to completely refute Zosimus; it is enough to give 
up on the idea of a powerful, professional and huge army. A law from the 
late 4th century53 mentions the Burgarii, probably watchmen that served 
as citizen troops, very vaguely regular, but nevertheless maintained by the 
provincials and supervised by the governors54; this idea fits perfectly well 
with the situation that could be taking place at Lusitania, without forget-
ting that the main weight of the war would be carried out by the private 
forces already described.
50. There is relatively recent archaeological evidence of the importance of the Ebro 
valley for Constantine: the Late-Roman building of Centcelles (Tarraco), traditionally da-
ted to the 4th century, has been identified as the central area of a military camp set up by 
Honorius’s troops, with the objective of recovering control over the Dioecesis after the fall 
of the usurpers (REMOllà and péREZ 2013, 161-186).
51. ZOS. 6. 4, 3.
52. SANZ SERRANO 1986, 236.
53. C.Th. 7. 14, 1.
54. SANZ SERRANO 2009, 168.
230 MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ PORTAENCASA
A FIFTH-CENTURY «GALLIC EMPIRE»:  
HISPANIA AS PART OF CONSTANTINE III’S USURPATION
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / CC BY-NC-ND Stud. hist., H.ª antig., 38, 2020, pp. 217-243
Apparently, this first assault caught Constans and Gerontius by sur-
prise55, and after the victory of the Theodosians, with their forces seriously 
decreased, they ought to ask Constantine III for reinforcements56. Only by 
arranging the events this way can Orosius’s statement57 that Didymus and 
Verinianus went with their troops to defend the Pyrenees be understood58: 
surely, they were trying to stop Constantine’s reinforcements sent from 
Arles from entering the Hispanias. This time, however, they lacked for-
tune. The reinforcements sent by the usurper overtook them, and in this 
last and definitive confrontation, victory was for Constans, who devastated 
the private armies of the Spanish. With the war ended, Theodosiolus and 
Lagodius fled from Hispania, taking advantage of their imperial kinship: 
the first one ran to take refuge at Ravenna, with his cousin Honorius, while 
the second seeked the protection of Theodosius II at Constantinople59. 
Didymus and Verinianus suffered a worse fate: together with their spouses, 
they were made prisoners and lead by Constans to Arles, to appear before 
his father, and were shortly after executed60.
Prior to leaving, Constans made sure to have all affairs in Hispania 
tied up so that their rule over the Spanish provinces was effectively con-
solidated. Thus, he appointed his own administration, leaving in his name 
both civil and military magistrates61. This gives a clue of the well-being of 
their Empire at the moment, and also confirms the assumption that those 
sent from Gaul initially had been the targets of the first attacks, therefore 
being substituted.
Constans could have just departed directly to Arles, as he did shortly 
after, leaving at Caesaraugusta his court and wife – indicative that, sooner 
or later, he intended to return –, and Gerontius as his lieutenant62. However, 
before, he decided to take a measure that ended up being a huge mistake: 
he entrusted the Honoriaci with the vigilance of the Pyrenees’ passes63, 
which had been traditionally guarded by local rustic troops64. It seems 
that the pleas and requests from the Spanish did not manage to change 
55. ZOS. 6. 4, 3.
56. SOZ. 9. 12.
57. OROS. 7. 40, 8.
58. ARCE 1982, 154-155.
59. SOZ. 9. 12; ZOS. 6. 4, 4.
60. OROS. 40. 3, 8; SOZ. 9. 12; ZOS. 6. 4, 3-4; 5, 1.
61. ZOS. 6. 4, 3; SOZ, 9. 12.
62. gREg. TUR. H.F. 2, 9.
63. SOZ. 9. 12; ZOS. 6. 5, 1.
64. These would be equivalent to the eastern Diogmitae or the western Saltuarii; se-
mi-armed troops, mainly watchmen, not regular, preferable to the Limitanei for these kind 
of territories (ARCE 2007, 49).
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his mind, despite the fact that these traditional defences, made up of men 
who knew properly the paths, were the only ones to work for a correct 
vigilance. The insistence with which the sources refer the way these locals 
asked for maintaining the privilege, and the very fact that Constans pre-
ferred the ones he thought trustworthy for the task, seems to show that 
the peoples that were wandering through the Gallic lands were not as 
controlled as Constantine III thought or willed, and that they were seen 
by all of them as a threat. This, together with another big mistake – allow-
ing the troops to raid over the fields of Palencia after their victory65 – 
would pave the way for the regime’s failure. Nevertheless, for the moment, 
Constans went to Arles quite pleased with himself, taking to his father the 
news on their victory.
3. RISE AND FAll OF THE lAST imperium Galliarum
Not earlier than autumn 408 A. D. would have Constans reached Arles 
to meet Constantine III. Along with him came his prisoners, Didymus, 
Verinianus, and their wives; all of them had their throats cut shortly after66. 
Barely nothing is known of the following months, but the odds are that 
Constans stayed with his father during the winter, as the weather would 
not have been very appropriate to travel through the mountains, not to 
say that they should have loads of work ahead by then, in order to defi-
nitely consolidate their Empire. After all, the usurper had finally managed 
to express his political agenda on the actual map, complete, now, with the 
annexation of the Hispanias. That meant he could once and for all attempt 
his final dream: claiming his rights before Honorius.
According to Zosimus67, early on 409 an embassy of eunuchs sent 
from Arles arrived at Ravenna. Constantine, careful not to appear imper-
tinent, since nothing should stand in the way of his long-awaited purple 
and him (not even his own pride), sent to Honorius the request to be 
forgiven for having agreed to take the crown, for he did not take it by his 
own will, but was forced to do it by the soldiers’ insistence. Taking into 
account that, by then, fickle Honorius was isolated (presumably, under 
the influence of suspicious figures such as Olympius), since Stilicho had 
65. OROS. 7. 40, 8.
66. ZOS. 5. 43, 2; 6. 5, 1.
67. ZOS. 5. 43, 1-2.
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been dead five months already68, and adding his congenital weakness to 
the critical situation at the time (with Alaric’s Goths at the gates), it is quite 
understandable how he eventually decided to consent obediently with 
his requests. For once, Honorius was positively realistic: he just could not 
afford one more war. If it was not political realism, then it was simple 
fear: Honorius saw in Constantine ‘a direct threat of impending dynasty 
change, if ever there was one’69. Zosimus points out too, as an important 
reason for giving in to the usurper’s requests: the concern about his cap-
tive relatives, possibly already deceased by then. Hence, the embassy left 
Italy and returned to Arles soon after, having accomplished its task, and 
Constantine was able to open the New Year with the imperial robes that 
he received. There is a funerary inscription dating to 409, IG XIV 255970, 
which reflects the joint consulship of both western Emperors: ‘Here lays 
Eusebia (…) who shortly lived to the age of fifteen, during the eighth 
consulship of Honorius and the first of Constantine. The day twelve of the 
month of Panemos, Sunday, in peace’71.
After accomplishing his aim, Constantine was able to enjoy a period 
of relief and serenity, although extremely short. While Constans returned 
to Spain, where he would supervise their control over the territory, he 
remained in Arles, probably very pleased with the achievements, but with 
his intentions set on his next ambition. If, within hardly two years, he 
had been able to evolve from an anonymous soldier to the master of the 
western triad, recognised with the purple by the Emperor himself, nothing 
could stop him from increasing his expansion. The distribution between 
Honorius and him that had seemed idyllic at first, now had fallen undoubt-
edly short; nevertheless, he – cunning as he was – awaited patiently for 
the turning up of the perfect opportunity.
It was already late 409 when, as had become usual lately, Honorius 
had once again troubles in his negotiations with Alaric. The Goth, who 
had both a statesmanship and a long-term vision much greater than the 
68. He was executed late in August 408 (ZOS. 5. 34, 7), due to courtly conjures. His loss 
was a disgrace for Honorius’s regime. As J. MATTHEwS (1975, 283) rightly said, «it remained to 
be seen whether any of his successors […] would be able to present policies so hopeful of 
success, and so realistic, as those of Stilicho». Vid. SANZ SERRANO 2016, 291-309.
69. HEATHER 2006, 225. In fact, not only Constans had been promoted to Caesar, but 
also his brother Julian had probably been promoted to nobilissimus by then already (PLRE 
II, Iulianus 7), so it seemed clear that Constantine had his succession guaranteed.
70. The inscription was found at Trier, and the month of Panemos, from the Macedonian 
calendar, which is mentioned on the inscription, corresponds with June. That means that, 
at the latest, by summer 409, Constantine’s imperial legitimation would be well widespread.
71. Translation by courtesy of Vangelis Aragiannis and Giorgos Dachris for this paper.
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Emperor’s, no longer demanded gold and had reduced considerably his 
requests of corn and lands: of course, ‘he had the military power to take 
pretty much whatever he wanted, but was willing to trade it in for a sta-
ble peace agreement with the Roman state’72. But Honorius was trapped 
between the rock of his indecision and the hard place of his bewilder-
ment, and, once again, rejected Alaric’s terms. As a result, Alaric returned 
and besieged Rome73, and Constantine III, more than probably, saw then 
his chance to increase his power. It is unlikely that he could feel very 
confident towards Honorius yet (despite the Emperor had given clear evi-
dence that he feared him, it is true that his recognition had been utterly 
reluctant, and he knew Honorius would hold on any opportunity to go 
against him), so getting in touch with the court of Ravenna to try and 
create friendly relationships, did not seem superfluous. As Zosimus tells74, 
Constantine sent Honorius a second embassy, this time lead by Jovius75, 
whose mission was to ratify the already negotiated peace, and, as well, to 
apologise for the execution of Didymus and Verinianus (which, alegedly, 
had taken place without Constantine’s consent or will). Probably, these 
matters, employed as excuses for the delivery and receipt of the embassy, 
were not the main concern of the usurper at all, but rather, his actual 
goal would be more a sounding out of the situation carried out by his 
envoys, looking forward to his coming Italian incursion. Zosimus contin-
ues his narration explaining how, seeing that Honorius was ‘immersed in 
confusion’, wily Jovinus used this to sweet-talk to him: he reminded the 
Emperor that he was not exactly in the best of positions at the moment, 
and suggested that it would not be very sensible to reject Constantine’s 
peace. He also managed to promise that, in exchange to having his trust, 
the usurper would be happy to provide him with all the troops (from 
Gaul, Hispania and Britannia) needed to free Italy from her unpleasant 
situation.
But Zosimus, unfortunately, leaves us in suspense. Honorius’s answer 
is a mystery, but it can be reckoned that it was far from good, perhaps due 
to the execution of his relatives, or to his usual scepticism. Constantine, 
however, was determined to seize Italy whatever the cost, so he surely 
had an alternative plan. If he had not managed to persuade Honorius into 
72. HEATHER 2006, 226.
73. Before demanding Priscus Attalus to be made emperor as well, which means that 
by then the West had already three Augusti.
74. ZOS. 5. 1, 1-2.
75. Who must not be mistaken by the praetorian prefect Jovius. This Jovius at 
Constantine III’s embassy was relative to Paulinus of Nola (PLRE II, Iovius 1), and is portra-
yed by Zosimus as an educated and virtuous man.
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getting his troops into Italy under the pretext of offering help, he would 
have to do it without his consent. Because of that, it was probably dur-
ing this trip that Constantine’s emissaries contacted the magister equitum 
Allobich and plotted an alliance with him.
As a result of these negotiations, in which both sides would have layed 
the plan down, Allobich provided them with the way to introduce their 
troops into Italy. The personal interests that the magister equitum could 
have in wanting to help Constantine are unknown, although perhaps he, 
too, considered necessary a dynasty change. Be it as it may, things finally 
did not turn out as they had expected. Constantine had now promoted 
Constans to Augustus76, surely so that he could rule over Hispania and 
Gaul during his absence, and, besides, to make sure that their Empire 
was secure even if his plans failed and he was unable to return. Leaving 
his son in charge, he, as Sozomen rightly says77, crossed the Cottian Alps 
and went into Italy entering from Libarna. As told by the Gazan historian, 
when they were just about to cross the river Po, Constantine received 
the news of his accomplice’s death. In effect, shortly before his arrival, 
Honorius had been informed that Allobich was under suspicion of trea-
son, and of his presumed plans of turning Constantine into lord and mas-
ter of the West, and had ordered his execution78. Immedietaly, Constantine 
found himself forced to abandon his plans and take refuge in Arles. The 
reasons of his flight are not specified, but it can be imagined that he 
would not be able to escape from Honorius’s troops, if he finally entered, 
without the help that Allobich would have provided, so he did not dare to 
take the risk and withdrew, just on time.
However, that would be nothing but the beginning of a series of 
catastrophes for him. Sozomen79 provides account on how, in Hispania, 
Gerontius, the general and lieutenant of Constans, and one of the pillars 
of their regime, turned from being Constantine’s right-hand man to his 
principal enemy. Taking advantage of the power vacuum80, he usurped 
the command and raised to the purple a man named Maximus. Not 
much is known on this character’s identity; Olympiodorus81 makes him 
son to Gerontius himself, and Sozomen82 says he was a domesticus from 
76. PLRE II, Constans 1.
77. SOZ. 9. 12.
78. To be precise, he was beaten to death before the Emperor’s eyes (OlyM. Frag., 14).
79. SOZ. 9. 13.
80. Constans would have returned to Arles again after his second promotion, during 
Constantine’s Italian incursion; to rule their Empire from its capital.
81. OlyM. Frag., 17.
82. SOZ. 9. 13.
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his home; although, most likely, he was some kind of dependent, per-
haps a client, like Frigeridus suggests in Gregory of Tours’s quotation83. 
What does seem clear is that Gerontius, for some reason, preferred to 
use a puppet than to directly place himself in the throne, and took up 
residence with Maximus at Tarraco84. The reasons he had for betraying 
Constantine are unknown; Zosimus85 points out that it was as a result of 
the appointment of a new general, Justus, which may have meant a threat 
for his position, although Justus’s appointment could have been not a 
cause but a consequence of Gerontius’s rebellion. Clearly, he was an indi-
vidual who enjoyed a great reputation among the troops; his very pres-
tige as a warrior had been enough for Goth Sarus’s withdrawal when he 
besieged Constantine in Valentia (vid. n. 23). This fame, surely, played on 
his favour before soldiers who were seeing how their Emperors did noth-
ing but being frequently absent, more concerned – especially Constantine 
– on expanding their possesions than governing those territories already 
annexed. It is possible that Gerontius spread the rumour of what had 
been dealt with at the second embassy: that Constantine was prepared 
to provide Honorius with his troops to expel Alaric86, and he could have 
used that information to influence them against the usurper.
Reconstructing the story from then on is not easy at all, since each of 
the sources contribute with their own version, with cross-references, com-
plementary and conflicting informations, quite messy and hard to inter-
pret. Each historian, based on the few reliable data and on intuition, has 
opted for their preferred version, and it is what will be done here as well, 
but always bearing in mind that it is not possible to make categorical 
assertions. It is well known that in the same year 409 the mass migrations 
of barbarian peoples into the Peninsula took place, and that it was, to a 
certain extent, related with Gerontius’s rebellion. Orosius87 states that it 
was the Honoriaci appointed as watchmen on the Pyrenees’ passes by 
the usurpers the ones who made their way for the peoples that roamed 
through Gaul, who, immediately, would have started to perpetrate raids. 
Sozomen88, in the same vein as the Spanish, says that these barbarian 
peoples entered because the Honoriaci neglected their duty, and that it 
83. gREg. TUR. H.F. 2, 9. Prosper of Aquitaine (Chron., 1245) also mentions him, when 
he says Maximus […] modestia humilitasque hominis […], but he means his character more 
than his social background.
84. SOZ. 9. 13.
85. ZOS. 6. 5, 2.
86. ZOS. 5. 1, 1-2.
87. OROS. 7. 40, 9.
88. SOZ. 9. 12.
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took place after Constantine was deprived from his power, that is, with 
Gerontius already ruling the Hispanias. Zosimus, the most emphatic of 
them, directly points at Gerontius as the one to blame, since, according to 
him, the general had raised up the Barbarians that were in Gaul against 
Constantine III, although this account of the story omits their incursion 
into the Hispanias.
What all of this seems to reveal is that Gerontius, looking forward to 
divesting Constantine of the prefecture of the Gauls, was conscious that, 
on one hand, he needed to increase considerably his troops, and on the 
other, it was crucial to get rid of the danger that the barbarians meant 
when crossing the Pyrenees to Arles. That way, he killed two birds with 
one stone: he gained followers who could fight for his cause, and turned 
possible enemies into allies. It would not be very difficult to earn their 
support: in the end, in all the time that Constantine had been occupying 
the throne at Arles, aside from punctual pacts, he had not offered them 
any kind of foedus nor any significant alternative for their settlement. After 
he crossed the English Channel in 407, he had let hundreds of people 
roaming aimlessly over the territory he was supposed to be ruling, and, 
in this case, had not been better emperor than Honorius. Gerontius eas-
ily could have persuaded these people, making them see an opportunity 
in the alliance with him, with the promise of being allowed to settle in 
Hispania or of raiding at will. Furthermore, these Suebi, Vandals and Alans 
were at enimity with the local aristocracies89, and Gerontius would have 
introduced himself as a public enemy of those, after having participated 
in Didymus and Verinianus’s overthrow. Thus, he gave order to open the 
frontiers, and while he increased his troops, as he needed in order to 
march against Constantine, the barbari were able to penetrate into the 
Hispanias, in an attempt to improve their situation.
During the last months of 409, news would have reached Arles, where 
a great alarm must have spread. Constantine hurried to send Constans, 
together with Decimus Rusticus90, the new praetorian prefect, to guard 
the towns around the area of Vienne (Isère)91, key to protect Arles, and 
also to recruit some barbarians92, those ones with whom they had made 
actual firm pacts. In addition, he sent Edobich (the general that had been 
appointed at the same time as Gerontius, when Sarus’s attack took place) 
89. SANZ SERRANO 2001, 89.
90. Former magister officiorum; he also had accompanied Constans in his Spanish trip 
back in 408. He succeeded Apollinaris when Constans was promoted to Augustus (PRLE II, 
Decimius Rusticus 9).
91. SOZ. 9. 13.
92. gREg. TUR. H. F. 2. 9.
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to the other riverbank of the Rhine, to recruit Alamanni and Franks for 
their army93. The year 410 was marked by these ‘civil conflicts’ between 
usurpers; Honorius, for his part, was not being able to take advantage 
of the situation on his benefit, since he continued immersed in the same 
troubles, considerably aggravated by the well-known sack of Rome that 
Alaric would carry out on summer of that same year. 
Gerontius, after having put the final touches on to his plans, and leav-
ing his puppet, Maximus, in Tarragona, advanced towards Arles94, presum-
ably accompanied by the troops that had seconded his rebellion, and by 
his new barbarian recruits. The fact that he marched towards Constantine 
and Constans, given that he had already seized the Hispanias, and tak-
ing into account that he already had the support of the majority of the 
troops, leads to think that Gerontius’s goal was actually to take control 
over the whole prefecture of the Gauls, as was mentioned, and not just 
the Hispanias, as generally believed: he wanted the Imperium Galliarum 
that Constantine had ‘restored’. What is more, he must have known 
Constantine and Constans’s plans of defending Vienne, because he did 
not take the road that would have taken him straight from the Pyrenees 
to Constantine’s fortress; rather, he turned off to the north, and, taking 
Constans by surprise, murdered him95.
Constantine III, meanwhile, remained in Arles. Surely, the news on 
his son’s death would not take long to reach him, but nothing is said in 
that regard. It only seems clear that he anxiously awaited Edobich’s return 
with the Germanic troops that were being recruited at the other side of 
the Rhine. Luck was not, however, on his side: for the first time in years, 
political normality was returning to the court at Ravenna. Honorius, at 
last, realised that he would not be able to confront the troubles with the 
barbarians unless he got rid of the usurpers first96. He gave the deceased 
Stilicho a worthy successor in the western position of magister militum, 
and Flavius Constantius came to be the senior general.
Constantius did not waste time; he headed for Arles to end the usur-
pation, accompanied by the Goth dux Ulphilas97. Gerontius, meanwhile, 
did the same; with Constans removed, he had cleared his way to attack-
ing Constantine in Arles. However, when he was told about the arrival 
93. SOZ. 9. 13.
94. SOZ. 9. 13.
95. OlyM. Frag., 17; SOZ. 9. 13; OROS. 7. 42, 4.
96. OROS. 7. 42, 1.
97. After these victories, he was promoted to magister equitum per Gallias or magister 
equitum praesenti (PRLE II, Vlphilas).
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of Honorius’s army, he fled fearful and seeked refuge back in Hispania98. 
While the troops leaded by Constantius had started a siege on Arles, 
Constantine resisted, apparently hopeful99, since there had been rumours 
that Edobich was not far away, and he would return accompanied by 
the many allies he had managed to recruit during the past few months. 
It seems that the news disturbed the Romans quite a lot, even making 
them think of withdrawing to Italy, but Constantius resolved to cross 
the Rhône in order to get them by surprise. He remained in a visible 
area, together with the infantry, and the moment Edobich arrived with 
his troops, ready for the battle, Ulphilas and the cavalry completed the 
ambush attacking from behind, and, thus, achieving the victory. Sozomen 
explains that Edobich was able to escape, and seeked refuge in the lands 
of Ecdicius, a landowner he had given service to some time ago. Ecdicius, 
however, handed over Edobich’s head to Constantius, putting, thus, an 
end to Constantine III’s last hope.
At the same time, in Hispania, Gerontius had been repudiated by his 
own troops, since they were greatly displeased by his withdrawal and 
flight100. They attacked his house at night and set fire to it101, and, although 
he could have saved himself, with the help of some servants and an Alan 
friend, the attacks were repeated the morning after. Feeling cornered, he 
beheaded his Alan friend, according to his own desire, before piercing 
with a sword his wife Nonnichia, who would also had implored it, prob-
ably fearful that they could end up either in the hands of their former 
friends or in the Roman troops’s. Sozomen102 closes his dramatic ending of 
the story, claiming that, at the end, Gerontius stabbed the sword himself 
not one but three times, before sticking a dagger into his heart and, finally 
ending his life at the same time as a completely new and different period 
was starting in the political history of the Hispanias. Maximus, then, ran 
away to live among the barbarians103.
In the meantime, in Arles, Constantius and Ulphilas’s troops had 
resumed laying siege to Constantine. When the usurper knew of Edobich’s 
death, aware that he had no escape and on the verge of despair, he 
dropped the purple and the imperial ornaments104. Then, he seeked refuge 
98. OlyM. Frag., 17.
99. SOZ. 9. 14.
100. SOZ. 9. 13.
101. OlyM. Frag., 17.
102. SOZ. 9. 13.
103. OROS. 7. 42, 4.
104. SOZ. 9. 15.
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and protection in the Church, receiving the sacraments105 and even being 
ordained as a priest. However, none of these efforts were able to stop 
Constantius. It was made known to the guards on the city walls that they 
could spare their lives if only they agreed to open the gates and hand over 
Constantine: no sooner said than done106. Frigeridus107 connects the haste 
of this attack to the possibility that there were news on the usurpation of 
Jovinus, so that Constantius preferred not to waste more time in Arles. After 
four months of besiege, the city of Arles opened its gates and Constantine 
III, finally, surrendered. Together with his son Julian, he was arrested and 
conducted to Italy108, where Honorius’s men executed them nearby the 
river Mincio109, before reaching Ravenna. The only part that the courtly 
city was to ever see of the usurper was his head, separated from his body, 
taken to a post for its exhibition, in Octobrer 411110.
4. CONClUSIONS
It is clear that Constantine III’s performance was only a small part of a 
trend which had started, at least, two centuries before. The situation orig-
inated from the times of Diocletian, when the prefecture system was cre-
ated – and subsequently settled under Constantine I. These emperors tried 
to mitigate the state of continuous usurpations that had been taking place 
during the 3rd century by having a praetorian prefect in charge of each 
prefecture, and thus, obtaining a stronger control. However, this structure, 
far from serving its purpose, led to the proliferation of new usurpations, 
this time generated within the actual prefectures, as evidenced by the 
previous usurpation of Magnus Maximus, one of the clearest role models 
followed by Constantine111.
Constantine III, then, was far from being the only usurper of his time. 
Neither was he the first nor the last one. However, his existence, for bet-
ter or worse, somewhat shaped the transformation of the world he knew. 
105. OlyM. Frag., 17.
106. SOZ. 9. 15.
107. gREg. TUR. H.F. 2, 9.
108. SOZ. 9. 15.
109. pROSp. Chron., 1234.
110. Cons. Const. s. a. 411.
111. On usurpers and usurpations, cf. FlAIg 1997, 15-33; MARTIN 1997, 47-62; NERI 1977, 
71-86; OMISSI 2018.
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For that reason, it is striking how unusual it is to find authors112 that ded-
icate a single chapter in exclusive to analyse his figure. He is, of course, 
frequently mentioned, but in the way of a sidekick of History, whose 
importance consisted in just a punctual connection with the ‘real’ main 
characters (Honorius, Stilicho, Alaric, etc.).
Studying thoroughly this period of usurpation as a whole, with no 
partitions, considering it an independent entity and not just a bunch of 
background facts, allows to build a more precise dating of events, and to 
support the starting-point hypothesis: Constantine III, unlike his prede-
cessors, was able to go a much longer way and to hold power for much 
more time not only because he immediately gave the troops the answer 
required, but mainly because he had an actual political agenda, which 
was resolutely developed, at least until 409 A. D.
Imitating the model inspired by the Gallic Empire, improved with cer-
tain aspects borrowed from Constantine I, he understood that the axis 
that Britain, Gaul and Spain made could be developed like a symbiotic 
entity, which would be much more effective for its defence than the inde-
pendent action of each territory. The problem was that Constantine, based 
on a valid idea, which could have succeded once he annexed the whole 
Prefecture of Gaul, failed in making it flourish. After a promising begin-
ning, he failed in the integration of the peoples roaming through the ter-
ritory. He did strengthen the eastern flank, and the control over the south 
as well, but, undoubtedly, it was a great mistake to leave (perhaps for not 
having logistics and troops enough for it) all those groups unintegrated, 
for it would turn against him and his provinces when Gerontius betrayed 
him.
In a way, it can be stated that Constantine’s role was necessary, taking 
into account how lacking political regeneration and government were the 
western provinces, and knowing how Honorius disregarded his duties, 
but in the end he fell in the same mistakes as the Emperor. The underesti-
mation that so frequently was done of the Germanic tribes played against 
everyone. Not because they were the destructive threat pictured in the 
sources; simply, because an element of such demographic dimensions 
could not be ignored.
The troops prompted usurpers to the purple just because they 
expected a proper leadership, and Constantine exceeded all expectations 
in the beginning. In less than two years, he went from an anonymous 
solider in faraway Britain to the leader of the whole Prefecture of Gaul, 
112. There are, of course, exceptions, such as STEvENS 1957, 316-347or DRINKwATER 1998, 
269-298.
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counting on very reduced troops and scarce resources, meaning a real 
threat to Honorius. To regard him as nothing more than an opportunist, 
whose success resided in a mere exploitation of the complicated situation 
lived by the West at the time, is quite simplistic. This episode actually 
serves as example of the transformation experienced by the political, mil-
itary and social structures thoughouth the western 5th century. However, 
it is also true that the deeds achieved were discredited when Constantine 
chose to prioritize the expansion of his power to Italy rather than strength-
ening what was already built.
The consequences for the Hispanias are well-known: indelible demo-
graphic changes. After Gerontius’s betrayal, mass migrations of Suebi, 
Vandals and Alans entered the Iberian Peninsula, picturing a whole 
new-configured map, which Romans from then on could only attempt 
to pacify and settle with consecutive foedera. Despite Constantine III’s 
project did not have a good ending for himself or his sons, he did, para-
doxically, a great favour to Honorius: only when the Emperor realised of 
the actual threat that the usurper meant, and that with Constantine rul-
ing he could not face the uncontrolled migratory flows, he gave Flavius 
Constantius the power once holded by Stilicho, and the Roman West was 
able to go on for some sixty-five years more.
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